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Abstract 
The effect of marriage on productivity and, consequently, wages has been long debated in 
economics. A primary explanation for the impact of marriage on wages has been through its 
impact on productivity, however, there has been no direct evidence for this. In this paper, we 
aim to fill this gap by directly measuring the impact of marriage on productivity using a 
sample of professional baseball players from 1871 - 2007. Our results show that only lower 
ability men see an increase in productivity, though this result is sensitive to the empirical 
specification  and  weakly  significant.  In  addition,  despite  the  lack  of  any  effect  on 
productivity, high ability married players earn roughly 16 - 20 percent more than their single 
counterparts. We discuss possible reasons why employers may favor married men. 
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Are married men more productive? Empirical estimates of the effect of marriage
on productivity and wages have been long debated in economics since seminal work
by Becker (1973, 1974). The main conclusion in standard cross-sectional log wage
regressions is that married men are estimated to earn roughly 10 - 40 percent higher
wages than their single counterparts. However, whether or not this increase in wages
is due to a causal effect of marriage on productivity has proven difﬁcult to pin down
due to the lack of readily available data that contain wages, marital status and objec-
tive productivity measures. We aim to ﬁll this gap by directly measuring the impact of
marriage on both productivity and wages using a unique database that we compiled
on professional baseball players.
There are a number of proposed explanations for why married men earn more
than their single counterparts. First of all, the positive correlation between marriage
and wages may simply be due to selection. In particular, selection may be based on
unobserved characteristics that are correlated with both marital status and produc-
tivity. Additionally, the positive correlation between marriage and wages may be due
to reverse causality where men with high wages or high wage growth tend to be more
successful in the marriage market. Alternatively, marriage may afford specialization
between household and non-household work. Because men are freer to concentrate
on non-household work, they therefore become more productive workers. Finally, em-
ployer discrimination is also considered as a possible explanation as married men
are often seen as more reliable workers. Ultimately, the effect of marriage on pro-
ductivity is of particular interest for analyzing gender-based discrimination in labor
markets, as the male marital pay premium accounts for about one-third of estimated
gender-based wage discrimination in the United States (Neumark, 1988). While the
2difference in earnings between men and women has shrunk since the late 1970s, a sig-
niﬁcant gender gap still remains.1 However, if the male marital pay premium derives
from increased productivity, then the proportion of the gender gap due potentially to
discrimination may be overstated.
A notable feature of our analysis is that we use direct objective measures of pro-
ductivity. Speciﬁcally, we consider professional baseball players, making use of data
we hand collected from the National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum data de-
positories and merged with a number of ofﬁcial productivity measures in baseball.
This rich dataset allows us to directly assess whether there is a relationship between
marriage and productivity as opposed to only an indirect linkage via wages. In addi-
tion, we are able to make use of these productivity measures, as well as institutional
details unique to wage setting in baseball, in testing for dynamic selection.
We ﬁnd a positive effect of marriage on productivity only for players in the lower
third of the ability distribution, though the effect is sensitive to the empirical speciﬁ-
cation and statistically weak. We ﬁnd no effect for higher ability men. Moreover, in
line with previous studies, our results also show that marriage and wages are posi-
tively correlated even after controlling for selection, though, only for certain players.
Married men in the top third of the ability distribution earn roughly 16 - 20 percent
more than their single counterparts. All of these results hold in the post-1975 era
when strict rules governing contracts were overturned and wages became free to re-
spond to market forces. We hypothesize that for higher ability men the impact on
wages may be due to a number of non-tangible aspects of marriage that are not nec-
essarily captured by our standard productivity measures such as stability, leadership,
negotiation skills and popularity. If such attributes have causal impacts on team rev-
enues then managers may have reasons to “discriminate” in their favor. Thus, it is
clear that how broad of a deﬁnition of productivity we take determines whether we re-
3fer to this positive effect on wages as discriminatory or simply capturing alternative,
less quantiﬁable productivity measures that impact marginal revenue product (MRP).
We provide some evidence in support of the latter, where marriage has a negative ef-
fect on the variance of our productivity measures for certain players (and a positive
effect for others) and a positive effect on the extraction of economic rent. That is, the
gap between marginal revenue product and wages is smaller for high ability married
players. In addition, we also ﬁnd that the team level fraction of married players is
positively correlated with ballpark attendance and team wins.
2 Literature
Our analysis touches on the literature from a number of different areas. First,
there is a vast literature that documents the very robust observation that married
men earn more than their single counterparts. All studies, both cross sectional and
panel data, typically include a measure of log wages for the dependent variable and a
binary indicator for marital status, some variation of marital status (never married,
cohabitation, divorced) or length of marriage along with other demographic controls
such as age, education, experience and race. Attempts are made to control indirectly
for cross-sectional variation in ability but cannot dismiss the interpretation that the
results are driven by unobserved individual characteristics and the effect is over-
stated due to selection into marriage.2 In other words, men with high unobserved
ability exhibit characteristics that are more likely to be found attractive by both em-
ployers and potential spouses (for example, stability, industriousness, physical ap-
pearance, etc.)3 Cross-sectional studies (for example, Bellas (1992), Blau and Beller
(1988), Blackburn and Korenman (1994), Chun and Lee (2001), Duncan and Holm-
lund (1983), Hill (1979), Kenny (1983), Korenman and Neumark (1991), Krashinsky
4(2004), Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987), Schoeni (1995)) have typically estimated a
marriage premium ranging between 10 - 40 percent.4 Panel data results have been
mixed, some studies ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant effect of marriage on wages while
others ﬁnd a residual positive effect (see, for Cornwell and Rupert (1995, 1997), Dun-
can and Holmlund (1983), Ginther and Zavodny (2001), Gray (1997), Hersch and
Stratton (2000), Korenman and Neumark (1991), Krashinsky (2004), Loughran and
Zissimopoulos (2009), Neumark (1988), and Stratton (2002)). Panel data studies with
a residual positive effect generally conclude that there is some causal effect of mar-
riage on wages, whether it is on productivity or merely discrimination is not com-
pletely resolved.5
The causal impact of marriage on productivity has received indirect support in the
literature. The aforementioned papers that found a residual effect of marriage on
wages, after controlling for individual ﬁxed effects and other controls, generally inter-
pret the effect as arising from specialization. Attempts have been made to test this
causal explanation by controlling for hours worked by the wife. Evidence is mixed.
Many of the papers that have contributed to this literature, for example, Daniel (1993
and 1995), Gray (1997), and Chun and Lee (2001) ﬁnd a wage penalty associated with
wife’s labor hours. On the other hand, Hersch and Stratton (2000), Loh (1996), Ja-
cobsen and Rayack (1996), and Hotchkiss and Moore (1999) ﬁnd little to no evidence
that wives’ labor force participation underlies the decrease in the return to marriage
for men.
To our knowledge, there are three papers that make use of productivity measures
and are therefore particularly relevant for our study. Korenman and Neumark (1991)
use data from a personnel ﬁle of a large U.S. manufacturing ﬁrm from 1976. The
data contain supervisor performance ratings that provide a measure of worker pro-
ductivity aside from the worker’s wage. The authors attempt to measure productiv-
5ity, albeit somewhat subjectively, and ﬁnd that nearly all of the return to marriage
(from 23 percent to 2 percent) disappears once adding pay grade and performance
rating dummies. Mehay and Bowman (2005) use administrative data on male U.S.
Naval ofﬁcers in technical and managerial jobs to explore the effect of marriage on
several job performance measures (e.g. promotion outcomes and annual performance
reviews). They ﬁnd that married men receive higher performance ratings and are
more likely to be promoted than non married men. In both cases, however, these are
subjective measures as it is plausible that supervisors simply perceive married men
to be more productive workers and therefore give them higher performance ratings
or grant them more frequent promotions.6 Finally, Hellerstein et al. (1999) use man-
ufacturing ﬁrm level data to estimate relative marginal products of various worker
types, in particular married versus single. They then compare these estimates to
wages. They ﬁnd that differences in wages between ever married and never married
men reﬂect a corresponding productivity premium. However, a weakness of their em-
pirical approach is that they cannot distinguish between the causality and selection
hypotheses.
The productivity measures we use, alternatively, are objective measures based on
exogenous, historical measures of productivity. These objective measures of produc-
tivity have been extensively used in the sports economics literature mainly for ana-
lyzing the role of labor contracts and more generally for studying the speciﬁcities of
the baseball labor market (Kahn, 1993; Macdonald and Reynolds, 1994; Rottenberg,
1956; Scully, 1974; Zimbalist, 2003), and the role of strategic management (Porter and
Scully, 1982; Smart, Winfree and Wolfe, 2008). Sports data has also been used to ad-
dress issues of race discrimination (Andresen and La Croix, 1991; Depken and Ford,
2006; Gwartney and Haworth, 1974; Hanssen and Andersen, 1999; Hill and Spell-
man, 1984; Lanning, 2010; Nardinelli and Simon, 1990; Price and Wolfers, 2010).
6The primary advantage for the use of such data is the availability of repeated mea-
sures of performance and visible characteristics of the player. The marriage premium
is potentially another form of discrimination and whether or not differences in wages
between married and single men are due to discrimination cannot be fully addressed
unless productivity is also taken into account.7 We note however, how one measures
productivity is clearly important in this analysis and we address this concern further
in Section 9.
3 A Model of Spousal Investment
There was one big glitch: these sorts of calculations could value only past per-
formance. No matter how accurately you value past performance, it was still an
uncertain guide to future performance. Johnny Damon (or Terrence Long) might
lose a step. Johnny Damon (or Terrence Long) might take to drink or get divorced.
(Lewis, ’Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game’, p. 136)
It was better than rooming with Joe Page.
Joe DiMaggio’s response when asked if his marriage to Marilyn Monroe was good
for him.8
In this section we sketch a model and provide intuition for the effect that mar-
riage has on spousal productivity and wages.9 We assume here that marriage im-
pacts wages through two channels. First, it impacts wages indirectly through its
positive causal effect on productivity that occurs because the wife engages in partic-
ular actions that impact the productivity of the husband.10 The main purpose of this
involvement is to provide her husband with uncluttered time. For example, a wife
may engage in home production such as cooking, cleaning and childcare so that her
7husband can focus on his career with fewer distractions. She may also provide career
advice and moral support or simply allow him extra sleep. Second, we also allow for
marriage to impact wages directly as opposed to indirectly via productivity. These di-
rect inﬂuences can take on a number of forms that may lead employers to discriminate
in favor of married men. For example, a wife may impact her husband’s popularity
and visibility through public image (for example, hosting formal dinners, participat-
ing in public events, charity events, etc.) or marriage may increase a man’s stability,
reliability (among other characteristics) that in turn make him a better teammate.
Like many high proﬁle professions, a professional athlete’s career is accompanied by
numerous formal and informal expectations and therefore not only is the manage-
ment of the athlete’s self-image important, but that of their wives is crucial too. The
wife represents her husband to the public, providing a visible link between the worlds
of work and family (Crute, 1981).11 In sum, through these two channels, the wife is
able to take actions that make each unit of her husband’s time in the market more
effective and/or more proﬁtable. All of these wage-enhancing activities are subsumed
under the heading of “augmentation activities.”
Thus, a husband’s wage is a function of direct augmentation activities and produc-
tivity while productivity is, in turn, a function of indirect augmentation activities and
innate ability. Both are also functions of other demographic characteristics such as
age and race as well as variables such as experience. We assume further that these
variables affect men of varying ability levels differently. We can therefore model pro-
ductivity and wages as follows:
P( ,t,X) and
8S = S(P, ,X), (1)
where P represents productivity, S is yearly salary,   is the direct and t the indirect
activities that impact spousal wages, and X is a vector of other variables that impact
productivity and wages, such as age, race, and experience, among others. Ability is
captured by  , where higher numbers represent higher innate ability.
We focus on the particular case of our model where wives invest solely in aug-
mentation activities and do not work. In addition, leisure is predetermined for both
spouses in order to abstract from the labor-leisure decision.12 Thus, total available
time for the wife (T) is divided between the two augmentation activities. There
are a number of interesting implications from this simple model. For instance, sup-
pose that two men have different ability but equal productivity, that is,  1 > 2 but
P( 1,t 1,X)=P( 2,t 2,X). Under the assumption of monotonicity of P(.), t1 <t 2 and
therefore  1 = T   t1 >T  t2 =  2. In words, conditional on equal productivity, the
wives of higher ability men spend less time on indirect and more time on direct aug-
mentation than the wives of lower ability men. As a result, S(P( 1,t 1,X),T t1,X)=
S(P( 2,t 2,X),T t1,X) >S (P( 1,t 1,X),T t2,X) by monotinicity of S(.). Another way
to think about it is as follows: in the case of differing abilities but equal time spent on
indirect augmentation, that is  1 > 2 and t1 = t2, we have P( 1,t 1,X) >P( 2,t 2,X).
Provided P(.) is quasiconcave, the marginal impact of an increase in t is decreasing
in ability.
Families maximize utility subject to standard budget constraints
max
t u(C) subject to
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where, in addition to the variables described above, C is consumption, and Y is
nonwage income. The indexes m and f represent male and female, respectively.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to t is as follows:
S1(P,T   t
f,X) · P2( 
m,t
f,X
m)   S2(P,T   t
f,X
m) (3)
where equality holds in the case of an interior solution (that is, the spouse does
not desire to spend more than T hours on augmentation activities). The left hand
side of equation (3) reﬂects the return to indirect augmentation while the right hand
reﬂects the implied return on direct augmentation. For a given value of  , the wife
equates the marginal value of one more unit invested in  f with the marginal value
of one more unit invested in tf. In this model, both spouses are fully invested in one
career. Wives form a work pattern that Papanek (1973, p.90) has labeled the “two
person career,” characterized by “...a combination of formal and informal institutional
demands ... (are) placed on both members of a married couple of whom only the man
is employed by the institution.”
4 A Primer on Baseball
Professional athletes are a subsample of the population where direct measure-
ments of productivity are observable. In contrast to other team sports, such as bas-
ketball and soccer, performance in baseball is directly quantiﬁable and with a number
10of measures that are relatively independent of the actions of the player’s teammates.
Moreover, while there have been changes in the rules over time, relatively speaking,
baseball is a fairly stable sport with a long history of uniform player statistics collec-
tion. The current typical baseball season is 162 games and runs from early April until
early October, followed by the post-season series in October that culminates with the
World Series. The regular season is typically divided into 81 “home” games, that is,
games played in the team’s home stadium and 81 “away” games. There are two main
types of players in baseball: pitchers and batters, each with their own productivity
measurements.13 The role of pitchers is to prevent the other team from scoring runs,
while the role of batters is score runs for the team. The overall goal in the game is to
score more runs than the opposing team.
4.1 Productivity Measures
As will be discussed in Section 5, we center our analysis on batters. There are
numerous measures of productivity for batters, among which experts will disagree as
to which is the “best.” We focus on a number of well accepted measures, the simplest
of which is the “Batting Average” (BA). BA is deﬁned as the number of hits divided
by the number of opportunities to bat (“at-bats”) in a season. Another conventional
measure is “On-Base plus Slugging” (OPS) which combines the “On-Base-Percentage”
(OBP) statistic that measures the number of ways a batter can get on base (hits,
walks and hit by pitch) with a measurement of the player’s ability to hit for power
(a weighted average of the number of bases reached per at-bat). We also consider
two other measures “Wins Above Replacement” (WAR) and “Performance Evaluation
Value” (PEVA). WAR is a measure that is meant to capture the value of a player (in
terms of wins) to the team and represents the number of wins a player provides the
11team above what a team would win were it to replace the player with an average
minor league player off the bench. PEVA, like WAR, is meant to provide an over-
all player rating. PEVA uses a complex formula to measure the overall statistical
performance of the player in a year. The measure compares players against other
players’ performance in a peer-to-peer era review. PEVA ranges from a minimum of
.2 to a theoretical maximum value of 64. A value of 3.5 is considered average and
anything above 10 is considered very good. The ﬁrst two measurements are calcula-
ble from Sean Lahman’s Baseball Archive (www.baseball1.com). WAR was obtained
from Sean Smith (www.baseballprojection.com) and PEVA from Stat Geek Baseball
(www.baseballevaluation.com). For each case, a higher number represents higher
productivity.
4.2 Wage Setting
Wage setting is notoriously complex in baseball with a number of important changes
over the past few decades. In 1975, the courts struck down the so called “Reserve
Clause.” The Reserve Clause, which was standard in all player contracts at this time,
stated that upon the contract’s expiration, the rights to the player were to be retained
by the team with which he had signed. This meant that practically, even though the
player’s obligations to the team as well as the team’s obligations to the player were
terminated (at the end of what was generally a six-year contract), the player was not
free to enter into another contract with another team. This effectively gave the team
market power over the player. Thus, if a player was not happy with his wage or a
trade to a particular team the most he could do was refuse to play. Post-1975, players
are generally considered to be valued at closer to their true market prices at all stages
of their careers.
12Figure 1 graphically illustrates the effect of the elimination of the Reserve Clause.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 breaks down the sample into players with less than six years
of experience and greater than or equal to six years. While, technically, the elimina-
tion of the Reserve Clause directly impacted those players with six or more years of
experience, the ﬁgure shows that the increase in wages was not limited to only those
players. Under the expectation that a player would eventually become a free agent,
a player is potentially able to extract economic rents earlier in his career. Panel (a)
shows that wages for all players began to more steeply increase post-1975 and panel
(b) shows in the normalized version of panel (a) that the increase in growth for players
with less than six years of experience is even slightly higher than for those players
with more than six years of experience. Thus, if marriage has an effect on wages,
we would expect that its effect would be stronger post-1975 when wages could more
freely respond to market factors.14
5 Data
The main database we use comes from the Baseball Archive, an extensive database
which is copyrighted by Sean Lahman (http://www.baseball1.com). It contains de-
tailed yearly performance information on players and teams from 1871 through the
current season (2007, at the time of data collection). Since the inception of profes-
sional baseball, there have been roughly 16,000 players (and just over 83,000 player-
years) that have played in at least one Major League Baseball (MLB) game. Our
contribution to the data was the addition of a number of variables (though not always
available for every player in every year): marital status, year of marriage, accurate
data on wages, and race. While these variables are generally publicly available, there
is no standard electronic source, and were therefore hand-collected on site for each
13player using the vast archives of the National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum
(HOF) located in Cooperstown, NY, USA. The main data sources were the National
Baseball Library and Archive player questionnaire collection and biographical clip-
pings ﬁles, Major League team media guides, The Sporting News Baseball Register,
1940 - 1968 and Topps Baseball Cards, 1951 - 1990 (for race data). In addition, these
main data sources were supplemented by player contracts, newspaper clippings and
internet searches when necessary. Interestingly, obtaining data on players from the
early part of the 20th century proved to be no more difﬁcult than more contemporary
players and often much easier due to the information available in the questionnaires
that were stopped in 1985. Wages for players after 1988 were obtained from USA To-
day, which is regarded to be the most accurate source for more recent player wages.
Prior to 1988, wages were not generally collected and made public and were therefore
collected from various sources housed at the HOF. In addition, wage data is not at all
available prior to 1905. Wages do not include deferred payments, signing bonuses and
incentive clauses, nor do they include any income earned by endorsements, or other
activities that are not included in the player’s contract with the team. This could be of
potential concern if we believed that single and married players have different prefer-
ences for the makeup of their salaries. While it is quite difﬁcult to verify this concern,
a sample of contracts from the 1990s in Section 8.2 does, at a minimum, provide some
evidence that married and single players do not sign contracts that systematically
differ in length nor do they differ in the composition between base salary, incentive
clauses and signing bonuses.15 While we would have liked to collect data on the uni-
verse of players, we were limited by money resources and by the available time of our
freelance researchers. We therefore took a simple random sample16 of 5,000 players
(batters and pitchers) that represented 31,000 player-years and ultimately were able
to recover data on marital status and/or year of marriage for roughly 27,500 player-
14years, wages (roughly 18,600 player-years), and race (roughly 4,800 players).
Table 1 contains summary statistics of the data. Of the 5,000 players for whom
we collected data, there are 3404 batters and 1767 pitchers.17 Because pitchers (a
ﬁelding position) are not generally evaluated according to batting productivity mea-
sures, we drop them from the analysis and reserve an analysis of pitchers for future
research. All forthcoming statistics and empirical analyses apply only to batters.
There are differences between the population and sample and these are due, in part,
to the fact that while we started with a random sample of players, the ﬁnal sample
that was returned to us was not completely random due to data availability. Some
players had very short, uneventful MLB careers and it was more difﬁcult to ﬁnd the
relevant information for these players. Thus, we were slightly biased against ﬁnd-
ing low skilled players with short careers. Nearly 30 percent of all players played in
only one MLB season.18 Moreover, recall that we stratiﬁed on years after 1948. This
would affect variables such as wages and career length that have been trending up
over time. Thus, because we sampled more heavily from a time period where career
lengths are longer, we are more likely to have a higher average value. We are less
concerned about differences in our sample that are due to selection on a factor such
as time because it is exogenous. We nonetheless note that if our estimation sample is
indirectly selected on ability, we may end up with married and single players coming
from different ability distributions. This is an important issue and we will return to it
throughout the analysis. Provided that marital status has a positive effect on perfor-
mance or, similarly, career length, this would mean that single players are predicted
to come from a distribution with a higher average ability, holding career length ﬁxed.
Finally, we additionally lose observations due to a number of reasons. First, for some
players we were able to recover marital status but not wages and vice versa. In addi-
tion, there are a few missing entries for the covariates from The Baseball Archive, for
15example, height, weight, right or left handed. These tend to be slightly concentrated
in the early years of the data. Finally, we drop observations where a player switches
teams mid season and where we could not ﬁnd race data.
The top panel of Table 1 contains rookie year demographic information. While the
average values of our demographic characteristics for the hand-collected sample of
batters are fairly similar to the full population of batters, we reject equality of means
in standard t-tests with the exception of the age variable, where we do not reject the
null. Race cannot, obviously, be compared to the full sample as this data is missing
in the population. Looking at the race variables, we see that 80 percent of batters in
our full sample are white, 13 percent are black, 10 percent are Hispanic, and a ﬁnal
category for all other races represents less than one percent of batters. Note that race
categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.19
Our main variable (marriedy) is deﬁned as a binary indicator equal to one if the
player is married in year y, zero otherwise. Sixty-nine percent of our sample obser-
vations are married player-years. This reﬂects a combination of observations from
players that are married during their entire careers and some who marry during
their careers. More precisely, 39 percent of players marry prior to beginning or in the
ﬁrst year of their MLB careers, while another 36 percent marry at some point during.
We also observe players that are single during their entire careers but marry at some
point after the career ends (seven percent), and the remaining 18 percent that never
marry as of 2007.20 For players who marry, we also attempted to collect the year of
marriage. To be clear, depending on when the player was active, we used a number
of different data sources to collect the marital status information. For example, for
players who had ﬁnished their careers by roughly the mid-1980s, our primary source
of information was the questionnaires that were typically ﬁlled out by the player after
the end of the career (or, sometimes by family members if the player was no longer
16living) and often provided information on month and year of marriage, sometimes the
name of the wife and some detail of the relationship (e.g. high-school sweetheart) if
the player married. If there was no information that would suggest that the player
latter divorced or was widowed, we assumed that the player remained married from
that point on and would ﬁll in his marital status accordingly. Alternatively, marital
status information for more recent players was typically found in the media guides
and would typically report whether the player was married in a particular MLB sea-
son. For these cases, we sometimes do not know year of marriage but when looking
up the player for each year of his career, we can know whether or not he was married
or single in that particular season. In some cases this allowed us to back out year of
marriage if the player married during the career. That is, if he is reported as single in
years y  1 and y and married in year y +1then we would record his year of marriage
as y +1 .21 However, if a player was always married during the career, there would
be no way to back out the year in which he married. We also tried to supplement the
questionnaires and media guides with other information in the player’s ﬁle, such as
newspaper clippings. We have no information on cohabitation, though it is certain
that some fraction of our single players cohabit without a formal marriage. The ex-
tent that cohabiters experience some of the beneﬁts of marriage only strengthens the
ﬁndings. In a similar vein, we also underestimate divorces due to the nature of the
data collection. Player questionnaires were often loath to provide negative informa-
tion on the player (such as substance abuse or divorce) and so we certainly attribute
positive marital status to players who may well be divorced. Again, assuming mar-
riage has an overall positive effect on our outcome variables, misclassifying divorced
players as married only strengthens our results. The second panel also reports salary
that is adjusted for inﬂation (1983 base year). The average income across players is
quite high at over $457,000. This is primarily driven by the fairly steep increase in
17wage growth that began to occur in the mid-1970s. The standard deviation in wages
has also increased over the years, roughly tripling between 1905 and 2007 as baseball
began to see its share of “superstar” players.22
The third panel contains information on the productivity measures and the fourth
panel contains a number of other important variables for the analysis. Similar to
the demographic characteristics, we reject equality of means between the population
and our full hand-collected sample of batters for each of the productivity measures.
As expected on the basis of our previous discussion, the productivity measures in the
sample are overall slightly higher than the population as a whole.
6 Residual Analysis
Before turning to our econometric models where we control for a number of impor-
tant covariates, we ﬁrst present a number of graphs that motivate the main analysis.
We plot productivity (BA) and wages against the ﬁrst 15 years of experience (which
covers 93 percent of observations). We restrict our sample to post-1975 (post Reserve
Clause, as we will further explain in the next section) and divide our sample based
upon initial expected ability. More precisely, we break the sample down into three
roughly equal groups based upon the distribution of rookie year plate appearances
(what we term “low,” “medium” and “high” expected ability) of the population of play-
ers within team. We use plate appearances as a proxy for expected ability and skill -
we assume that a player that is expected to perform well will be given more play time,
all else equal.23 Granted, the number of plate appearances in the rookie year is not a
perfect measurement of expected ability as, for example, teammate injuries and posi-
tion in the batting lineup also impact plate appearances. Using an alternative proxy
such as rookie year batting average to generate the groups provides overall similar
18results.24 In order to keep this section as parsimonious as possible, we discuss over-
all patterns in the data and defer discussions of statistical signiﬁcance to Section 7
where we introduce a number of important covariates.
Consider the ﬁrst column of graphs in Figure 2 where average salary (CPI ad-
justed) is plotted against experience. Generally speaking, the salary of single players
is greater than or equal to that of married players at all levels of experience. The ex-
ception to this is for the low ability types at high levels of experience where married
players earn more on average. The differences in salary are particularly pronounced
for the middle and high ability group at higher levels of experience. Now, consider
the right column of the same table where the residuals from a regression of salary on
individual ﬁxed effects are plotted against experience. The residuals from this regres-
sion contain the elements of salary that are uncorrelated with underlying individual
time constant ability (or any other time constant characteristic). The differences in
salary for the low ability groups almost completely disappear. The middle and high
ability types, in contrast, show a rather interesting pattern. Until six or seven years
of experience, both married and single players have negative residuals reﬂecting that
predicted (or average) within individual salaries are higher than current salaries (un-
surprising given the upward trend over the career) but what is more interesting here
is that married players now have higher residual salaries. Married players now earn
more than single players until roughly six years of experience and then the relation-
ship reverses, though the gap between the two groups is lessened. The obvious ﬁrst
thing to check is whether productivity exhibits a similar pattern. Figure 3 presents
the analogous graphs where the variable plotted on the vertical axis is now produc-
tivity (BA). The left column plots the unconditional variable and the right column
the residuals from a regression of BA on individual ﬁxed effects. The left column
shows that low ability married players have higher productivity levels than their
19single counterparts whereas the reverse relationship holds for the middle and high
ability groups. The right column, however, shows that once controlling for individual
time constant effects, clear differences in productivities between married and single
players disappear. Thus, in general, the relationship between productivity, wages and
marriage appears to have a different dynamic for the low ability types as compared
to higher ability types. Now revisit subﬁgure (f) of Figure 2 (and a similar discussion
could be made for subﬁgure (d)). Based upon these graphs, high ability married play-
ers do not appear to be markedly more productive that their single counterparts at
lower levels of experience, yet, they earn more and the same can be said for single
players at higher levels of experience. One possible explanation is that differences in
wages and productivity are due to other factors for which we have yet to control (and
will do so in the next section). A second explanation is that even after controlling for
other relevant variables, differences in wages are due to discrimination on part of the
employers where early in the career marriage serves as a positive signal for future
productivity. A third and further explanation is that BA (or OPS, WAR, PEVA) does
not capture the full productivity and value of the player to the team. Finally, the com-
position of the sample is changing over time due to attrition (potentially endogenous).
Consider the following stylized example. Suppose that all players of a certain ability
level last at least six years in the MLB and suppose further that marriage increases
career length (due to a more stable lifestyle, for instance) in ways unrelated to innate
ability. Thus, when comparing married and single players with more than six years
of experience we are comparing single players with higher average ability to mar-
ried players who have lower average ability and who otherwise would not have had
such long careers but for the fact they are married. Thus, while marriage has a pos-
itive effect on career length and potentially life time earnings, it would appear that,
conditional upon experience, marriage has a negative effect due to fact that single
20players with similar levels of experience earn more. We further address these issues
in Sections 7 and 8.1.
7 Econometric Speciﬁcation
As we saw in the previous Section, the extensive data available from The Baseball
Archive allows us to follow a large sample of players over the span of their careers. In
this section, we present a more formal econometric analysis of the basic observations
from Figures 2 and 3. Panel data allows us to hold constant individual-speciﬁc fac-
tors, essentially identifying the effect of marriage on productivity (and wages) from
changes in marital status over a player’s career and allows differentiating between
the self-selection and causality arguments. Identiﬁcation in the ﬁxed effects speci-
ﬁcation will be coming off of the 36 percent of players that switch marital status at
least once during their careers while an OLS speciﬁcation uses variation in marital
status across players and time. It is obvious that marital status is not the only factor
that potentially affects productivity. Many other factors are well known to affect pro-
ductivity, such as age and experience. In addition, because our data span well over
one hundred years, certain historical events such as World War II, the Korean War,
and rule changes that inﬂuence our productivity measurements over time should be
taken into account. In addition to the aforementioned demographic information, we
also include team-ballpark, ﬁelding position, manager, and year ﬁxed effects as well
as indicator variables that capture major rule changes that may impact productivity
and/or wages.
217.1 The Effect of Marital Status on Productivity
Our baseline speciﬁcation is:
PRODiy =  0MARi(y 1) + x
  1 +  i +  t +  p +  y + µm +  iy (4)
where i and y indicate person and year indexes, respectively. Our main coefﬁcient
of interest is  0 that captures the mean effect of marital status on productivity (BA,
OPS, WAR or PEVA). Marital status is lagged by one year reﬂecting the fact that the
effect of marriage may occur with a delay.25 The vector x includes a number of individ-
ual characteristics as described in Table 1. These include binary indicators for race
(not mutually exclusive), height and weight in rookie year, binary indicators of right
and left-handedness (not mutually exclusive), age and its square, experience and its
square, lagged number of games played in the season (as a proxy for injuries) and
binary indicators for three or more years experience in MLB and six or more years
experience in MLB. Finally,  i,  t,  p, µm and  y represent individual, team-ballpark,
ﬁelding position, team manager, and year ﬁxed effects.26 The idiosyncratic error term
is represented by  iy and is clustered by player. As previously noted, our preferred
estimation is an unobserved effects model that controls for time invariant individual
characteristics, particularly ability. Thus, any residual effect of marital status should
reﬂect its causal impact on the productivity measures. In this speciﬁcation, we in-
clude only those control variables that vary nonlinearly over time. These include the
squared age and experience terms, the lagged value of games played, three or more
years experience in MLB, and six or more years experience. Tables 2 and 3 present
estimates of the effect of marriage on productivity pre- and post-1975, respectively.27
Panel A reports the results for BA, panel B for OPS, panel C for WAR, and panel
D the results when we consider PEVA as the productivity measure. We estimate the
22model initially including only the lagged indicator for marital status (columns 1-2 and
6-7) and then this lagged indicator interacted with the three ability levels (columns
3-5 and 8-10). Finally, we estimate both OLS (columns 1,3,6 and 8) and FE (columns
2,4,5,7,9 and 10) models.
In order to obtain accurate measures of productivity, we restrict our sample to
players that have a minimum number of plate appearances. The reason for this is
that our productivity measures are yearly averages and if a player did not have a
sufﬁcient number of plate appearances (or at-bats) during the course of a season, we
possibly obtain productivity measures that while theoretically possible are practically
illogical. For example, if a player has only a few plate appearances during a season, it
is quite feasible for him to have a batting average of zero (0.000) or even a thousand
(1.000). Suppose his batting average is 1.000, it would be foolish to suggest that this
player has extremely high productivity – in fact, the opposite is more than likely.
This is a statistical problem in the sense that in this instance we do not have enough
observation points to accurately calculate a season mean. There is no set rule as to
how many observations we need in order to have an accurate measure of productivity.
Of course, the more the better but this comes at the cost of losing observations.28 As
such, we chose a number of cutoffs to test the robustness of our ad hoc restrictions.
Restrictions of 20, 50 and 100 plate appearances in a season provide similar results
as does using all the data and weighting by the inverse of plate appearances. For
brevity, we present only the results based upon the 100 plate appearances restriction
and other restrictions are available upon request.
Consider ﬁrst Table 2. Pre-1975 results are generally not signiﬁcant. This is the
case also when we separate by ability level, with the single anomalous effect of mar-
riage on productivity for the middle ability players (columns 9 and 10 of Panel D).
Results are more interesting, however, when we consider the years after the Reserve
23Clause. Looking across the columns in the ﬁrst row of all panels of Table 3, we see
that the simple indicator for the lagged value of marital status is not correlated with
standard productivity measures at any conventional level of signiﬁcance. For exam-
ple, in column 2 of Panel A, the effect of the lagged value of marital status is an
increase in batting average of 0.002 points – an insigniﬁcant and small effect given
the mean of batting average of 0.249 (std dev of 0.072). It is interesting to observe
that the estimated coefﬁcients increase when moving from OLS (columns 1 and 6) to
FE (columns 2 and 7) for all productivity measures. This would suggest a negative
correlation between ability and marriage.
An interesting pattern is revealed once we divide the sample based upon the ini-
tial ability levels. While statistical signiﬁcance is not consistent, the low ability is
the only group to repeatedly show a positive point estimate for the effect of mar-
riage on productivity. Consider Panel A, for example. Married, low-ability, players
have batting averages that are ﬁve points higher in the OLS speciﬁcation and seven
points higher in the FE speciﬁcation. These results are signiﬁcant at ten percent.
This ﬁnding is also robust to the various restrictions on PA mentioned above. OPS, is
consistent in terms of the point estimates but lacks any ﬁnding of statistical signiﬁ-
cance for any of the groups (Panel B). Panels C and D conﬁrm signiﬁcant correlation
in certain speciﬁcations between marital status and productivity for players in the
low ability group. In particular, in column 5, WAR shows signiﬁcant correlation at
ten percent level, and PEVA (column 9) shows signiﬁcant correlation at a ﬁve per-
cent level where married players score roughly 33 percent higher than single players
based on the average post-1975 PEVA of 3.09. An even higher effect is obtained for
PEVA when weighting by the inverse of PA (column 10). Across the board, particu-
larly for the WAR and PEVA measures, the point estimates for the low ability group
are of many magnitudes larger than for the other two groups. The medium and high
24ability groups, in contrast, show relatively small point estimates and signs that ﬂip
back and forth between negative and positive estimated effects. Nothing is signiﬁcant
at conventional levels. Thus, in sum, there is no evidence that marriage is correlated
with higher productivity for the medium and high ability groups and there is some
evidence that players from the low end of the ability distribution see a positive and
signiﬁcant effect, particularly in the FE speciﬁcations.29
Finally, we now return brieﬂy to the model from Section 3. One of the predictions
from the model is that the wives of low ability men invest more in indirect as opposed
to direct augmentation. While we can only use marriage as a rough proxy for in-
vestment in augmentation activities, the results from this section lend support to the
idea that any potential effect on wages of low ability players is at least partially com-
ing from their increased productivity. Medium and high ability players experience
no such impact on productivity and thus, any potential impact on wages would have
to come from the direct augmentation activities. Thus, while marriage may overall
impact the wages of the different ability groups, the mechanism differs among them.
7.2 The Effect of Marital Status on Wages
The previous section established that we estimate a consistently positive point es-
timate for marital status for low ability players (again, we acknowledge that these
results are sensitive to the particular productivity measure and the empirical model)
and no statistically signiﬁcant robust effect on productivity for any of the other play-
ers. We next check whether there is any evidence that marital status impacts log
wages. As previously noted, evidence of an impact on wages without a corresponding
impact on productivity may be evidence of positive discrimination in favor of married
25men.30 As such, we estimate the following equation:
log(wages)iy =  0MARi(y 1) +  1PRODi(y 1) + x
  2 +  i +  t +  p +  y + µm +  iy (5)
where the dependent variable represents log wages for player i in year y and the
remaining variables are as previously deﬁned. We include among the covariates a
measure of productivity thereby allowing for marital status to have a direct impact
on wages as opposed to only the indirect impact through productivity.
Broadly speaking, Table 4 shows little evidence of a direct effect of marriage on
wages with the exception of the high-ability group post-1975. There are, nonetheless,
a number of things to note from this table. First, similar to the productivity results,
the pre-1975 subsample shows no effect of marital status on the outcome variable.
Second, consider the OLS speciﬁcation from column 8. The point estimate is negative
and signiﬁcant for the middle ability group and positive and insigniﬁcant for the low
and high ability groups. Next, when moving from column 8 to column 9 (from OLS
to FE), the point estimate for the low ability group falls (though neither is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant) and increases for the medium and high ability groups, though only
the high ability group increases both in magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance, that
is from .042 (standard error of .044 ) to .162 (standard error of .059). This is similar
in spirit to what we found in Table 3 and more directly in contrast to the general
consensus in past literature that OLS suffers from a positive bias due to unobserved
individual characteristics that are found attractive by both potential wives and em-
ployers. The increase in the estimated coefﬁcient when moving from OLS to FE would
suggest a negative correlation, that is, individual, time constant characteristics that
are found attractive to employers are actually unattractive to potential spouses. This
is not completely without foundation. The type of individual that has the dedication
26to the sport that is needed to succeed at such a high level may have little left for time
demands outside of the work environment. As before, including additional lags of
marital status does not signiﬁcantly change the results. The results also show that
the lagged value of productivity is highly signiﬁcant across all columns, illustrating
that productivity is clearly an important component of wage determination.31
Thus, to summarize the ﬁndings at this point, we ﬁnd some evidence (though
weak) that marriage has a positive effect on the productivity of low ability players.
Using the estimated result from Table 3, where low-ability married players have bat-
ting averages that are seven points higher (Table 3, column 4), and combining this
with the return to productivity from Table 4, column 9, translates into roughly 1.6
percent higher salary (2.296*.007= .016). This is a relatively small effect and conceiv-
ably not statistically signiﬁcant. From this same table we see that there is no direct
effect of marriage for low ability players. Medium ability players show no consistent
patterns in the effect of marriage on productivity nor on wages. Despite ﬁnding small
point estimates and no statistically signiﬁcant effect of marriage on productivity for
high ability players, there is a direct effect of marriage for this group where married
players early approximately 16 - 20 percent more than their single counterparts. In
the next section we address some of the threats to identiﬁcation and then return to
address this interesting ﬁnding – if it is not higher productivity that is driving the
increased wages for high ability players, then what is?32
Finally, we note that if we instead cluster the standard errors by team, rather
than player, our main results are actually strengthened (statistically signiﬁcant ﬁnd-
ings either remain at the same level of signiﬁcance or become more signiﬁcant and
virtually no changes for non-signiﬁcant ﬁndings).
278 Threats to Identiﬁcation
In this section, we address a number of remaining issues that potentially impact
our empirical results.
8.1 Nonrandom Attrition
Parametric and nonparametric hazard models conﬁrm that married players have,
on average, longer careers than single players (unreported). Moreover, taking arbi-
trary career lengths such as three, four or ﬁve years, we found that in a cross-section,
when regressing binary indicators for having a career length of at least three, four or
ﬁve years on marital status, productivity and other demographics, we found that mar-
riage always had a positive and signiﬁcant effect. Both of these results conﬁrm that
marriage is somehow correlated with career longevity, though, a priori, do not elim-
inate the possibility that it is simply time-constant unobserved ability that explains
the correlation.33 In order to more precisely test whether attrition is correlated with
our dependent variables we took a simple approach based upon Nijman and Verbeek
(1992), where a lead of the selection variable is included as an explanatory variable in
our ﬁxed effects regressions. The selection variable equals one in years in which the
player is observed and zero in the year he leaves the sample. This lead of the selection
variable was consistently statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting correlation between the
dependent variable and attrition.
We take two approaches to addressing this issue: sample restrictions on experi-
ence and inverse probability weighting (IPW) [see Mofﬁtt, Fitzgerald, and Gottschalk
(1999) and Wooldridge (2000)].34 In the ﬁrst approach, we cut the sample at vari-
ous years of experience to test the sensitivity of our results to the attrition problem.
We assume that the attrition problem is less severe at lower cutoffs. For brevity, we
28present only two of the productivity measures, BA due to its popularity and PEVA
due to its superior measure of productivity. Panel A of Table 5 replicates Panel A, col-
umn 4 of Table 3, Panel B replicates Panel D, column 4 of Table 3 and, ﬁnally, Panel
C replicates column 10 of Table 4. Each of the ﬁrst ﬁve columns incrementally re-
stricts from 4 to 20 years of experience. Columns 1 - 5 of Panel A show an increasing
point estimate for the low ability group, though, statistically signiﬁcant only at higher
levels of experience. Considering that ability and marriage appear to be negatively
correlated from prior results while ability and experience positively so suggests that
as years of experience grow the sample of married players that remain perform at a
particularly high level and thus have longer careers than what would be expected.
Panel B, alternatively, shows a fairly consistent pattern for the low ability group past
four years of experience and is signiﬁcant at a minimum level of ten percent. Panels
A and B show no signiﬁcant results for the other two ability groups, consistent with
the main ﬁndings.
Panel C, alternatively, shows a slightly increasing and statistically signiﬁcant re-
sult (past four years of experience) for the high ability group and nothing for the
lower two ability groups. Again, this is consistent with the main results. Panels A
and C do suggest that endogenous attrition may be impacting the main ﬁndings as
the point estimates increase at different cutoff levels. In this regard, a more con-
servative estimate would be to use the results from column 2 where the productivity
results are somewhat weakened and high ability married players earn closer to 13.4
percent higher wages than their single counterparts (rather than 16 - 20 percent from
Table 4).35
The second approach, IPW, involves two steps. First, for t =2 ,...,T, we estimate
a probit regression of a binary variable equal to one if the player has not left the
sample, zero otherwise, on observables in the ﬁrst period when the sample was chosen
29randomly.36 We then calculated ﬁtted probabilities,   pit and generate weights equal to
1/  pit (for t =1 ,   pit = 1 for all i).37 Wooldridge (2000) shows that IPW provides a
consistent, asymptotically normal estimator. Generally speaking, player observations
later in the career receive larger weights reﬂecting the lower probability of these later
years being observed, conditional on observables. The ﬁnal column of Table 5 reports
the IPW results where we again replicated the post-1975 FE speciﬁcation. The results
are very much in line with the main ﬁndings.
8.2 Contracts
As alluded to in previous sections, contract setting in baseball is fairly complex.
Moreover, historical contract data is, to our knowledge, not available in any public
forum. We were, nonetheless, able to obtain three years (1994, 1996 and 1997) of
“Joint Exhibit 1,” an ofﬁcial document produced annually by Major League Baseball
(the sport’s governing authority) and the Major League Baseball Players Association
(the players’ union) pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The Joint Exhibit
1 contains authoritative, comprehensive descriptions of contract terms for all players
active on August 31 of the prior season. These data contain contract information for
players with at least three years of experience and cover nearly all players who were
under such contracts from the mid-1990s to 2001 (roughly 1470 contracts). There
are a number of interesting aspects of this data to note. First, fully 64 percent of
all contracts are for one year and 90 percent are for three years or less. From our
perspective, this is a positive ﬁnding. Short-term contracts allow for salary to respond
more ﬂexibly to changes in marital status, productivity and other factors.
Once merging this contract data to our dataset, we were able to match nearly 750
contract years for 275 players. A second interesting aspect of the data is that once
30controlling for position and experience, we do not reject the null hypothesis that mar-
ried and single players have similar contract lengths (p-value of 0.48), or have similar
preferences for the makeup of their salaries, where total salary in the ﬁrst year of the
contract is comprised of base salary, signing bonuses and incentive clauses (p-values
between .31 - .95). Finally, we attempted to re-estimate our baseline log wage re-
sults using this matched data and restricted to observations that were not locked into
multiyear contracts (roughly 475 observations), under the hypothesis that salaries
would not be ﬂexible after a contract was set. The results from this estimation were
inconclusive – the point estimates were consistent with our baseline ﬁndings but not
statistically signiﬁcant. Even so, under the assumption that the 1990s are rather rep-
resentative of other decades (at a minimum post-1975), we are more conﬁdent that
contracts are not severely hampering ﬂexibility in salary setting in our main database
nor do there appear to be any obvious differences in preferences in contract setting
between married and single players.
8.3 Reverse Causality (Dynamic Selection)
An important issue yet to be fully addressed is that of reverse causality. In-
creased wages and propensity to marry may be correlated with time variant unob-
served characteristics of the player (for example, becoming a more “serious” individ-
ual). If changes in these individual characteristics manifest themselves fairly simul-
taneously with higher productivity and/or increases wages and changes in marital
status, the nature of our data would make separating out the direction of causality
difﬁcult. While we cannot directly test the impact of changing unobservable char-
acteristics of a player, we rely on correlated observables such as wages, productivity
and their growth rates that impact the probability of marriage.38 To our knowledge,
31Korenman (1988) is the only paper that attempts some sort of formal test. He ﬁnds
no evidence for reverse causality when regressing current wages on future marital
status. We are able to undertake tests similar to Korenman (1988) where we regress
current wages and wage growth on future marital status. We can also make use of the
institutional setting unique to baseball that provides exogenous variation in wages
but is arguably uncorrelated with marital status. For a sample of players who are not
married by their ﬁrst year in the league, we can test whether they are more likely to
get married after their third year post-1973 when the player becomes arbitration eli-
gible or after their sixth year post-1975 when the Reserve Clause is no longer binding.
In both cases, wages tend to sharply jump up. Second, we can check how productiv-
ity growth impacts the probability of marriage. If a player performs well, there may
be increased expectations that he will eventually be compensated with higher wages
once he can renegotiate. Thus, while his current wages are not at his full earning
potential, high levels of productivity or productivity growth may predict an increased
future wage and propensity to marry. The fact that we are able to control for current
productivity and its growth greatly improves the ability to test for reverse causality.
Table 6 presents the results. In columns 1 - 4, the dependent variable is a binary
indicator of whether or not the player marries in the subsequent year, y +1 , whereas
in columns 5 - 8 it is whether or not the player marries in year y +2 . As in prior
regressions we include all the binary indicator controls (year, team-ballpark, etc) and
the individual controls of age, experience and their squared terms, the race indica-
tor variables, height, weight and right/left handed and the lagged value of games
played. We estimate all the models using standard OLS so that we even allow for
time constant unobservables to partially explain the probability of getting married.
Moreover, we interact all of our potential predictors of marriage with the ability in-
dicators. Columns 1 and 5 take a reduced-form type approach - we are interested in
32whether players after their third or sixth years are more likely to marry given that
wages tend to sharply increase after these milestone years. The results show that
players are no more likely to marry. We subsequently include the lagged value of
wages (columns 2 and 6), their growth rate (columns 3 and 7) and lagged productivity
growth rates (columns 4 and 8). With the exception from column 6 that shows that
higher log wages for the low ability group weakly predict a higher probability of mar-
rying two years later, and from column 8 that shows that higher productivity growth
rates for the medium ability group weakly predict a lower probability of marrying
two years later, none of the speciﬁcations show that lags of wages or productivity are
statistically signiﬁcant predictors of future marital status, suggesting that our main
ﬁndings are not obviously driven by reverse causality. We also note that we checked
contemporaneous correlation and longer leads of marriage such as three and four
years. None of the speciﬁcations showed that our independent variables of interest
were good predictors of marriage (unreported but available upon request).
9 Discussion
The results from Section 7.2 have established that marriage has a direct effect on
earnings of the high ability players and no effect on low and medium ability players.
This leads to two questions. First, why do employers appear to discriminate in favor of
married players given the lack of any improvement in productivity and why only high
ability types? We expect high ability men to beneﬁt more from direct augmentation
(activities that directly impact wages) because the beneﬁts of indirect augmentation
(activities that indirectly impact wages through productivity) are relatively small by
this level of skill. These are men who begin their careers already in the upper third
of the ability distribution, marginal gains in productivity are difﬁcult to achieve and
33are small. Thus, for high ability men, the wife’s role has mainly to do with the direct
aspects of augmentation activities, such as public image. The beneﬁts of the direct
augmentation activities “kick in” once productivity is nearing high levels such that
men ﬁnd other ways in which to compete and set themselves apart from others in
their profession. In contrast, the most likely augmentation channel for the low ability
player has more to do with ways in which the wife can allow him to improve in his job.
Allowing him to dedicate more scarce resources, like time, to his work, can do this.
We do ﬁnd some weak evidence for this in Table 3 and this translates into a fairly
negligible 1.6 percent increase in wages. The fact that the pre-1975 results show no
consistent patterns or statistical signiﬁcance, on average, for any of the players for
either productivity or wages, leads us to surmise that the role of the wife has changed
over time. More recent periods see a much more visible presence of the wife and her
role in the husband’s career.39 This is true for many high proﬁle professions where
the wife is seen as a potential asset in the husband’s success. However, it is difﬁcult to
parse out the changing role of the wife from the changing rules that impacted salaries.
Both are identiﬁed over time and our data are not sufﬁciently nuanced to separate
the two.
Thus, if employers discriminate in favor of married high ability players, we hy-
pothesize that there must be some added beneﬁt to teams to having such players that
we have not fully captured by considering only the standard productivity measures.
This is consistent with a relatively small literature that documents that employees
are also rewarded for noncognitive qualities in the workplace. For example, Klein,
Spady, and Weiss (1991) ﬁnd that given equal productivity in a semi-skilled assembly
line job, workers with higher education earn more. Education in this case proxies
for lower unobserved quit propensities. Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) ﬁnd
that noncognitive ability is at least as important, if not more, than cognitive ability
34in determining wages. Along these lines, while we ﬁnd that married players are not
necessarily more productive, what is often important from the team’s perspective is
“the bottom line,” the marginal revenue that married players generate may be higher
than single players. This may be due to the image and popularity of a player increas-
ing the fan base or perhaps more subtle beneﬁts to the team that are not captured by
batting productivity. Marriage may lead to stability, reliability, maturity and leader-
ship skills that single players of the same ability level are less likely to have. This
interpretation is in line with the three-factor model of interpersonal trustworthiness
(ability, integrity, benevolence) established by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995).
All three factors of ability, benevolence, and integrity can contribute to trust in a
group or organization. Ability is only one of these determinants, and married men
are more likely than single men to score higher on the other two dimensions (i.e. in-
tegrity and benevolence). These later characteristics, in turn, contribute to greater
team success. There are a number of variables that should be correlated with the
positive aspects of image, stability and leadership skills that we can analyze. In the
subsequent subsection, we take a number of approaches at both the individual level
and team level in order to gain insight into these issues.
9.1 Individual Player Level Approach
First, we look at individual level regressions where we estimate whether married
players are more likely to become “all-star” players, where “all-star” is a measure of
player popularity and skill, among other factors. We ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant
effect of marriage on the probability of being chosen to be an all-star player (unre-
ported but available upon request). Next, we checked whether marital status has
any impact on performance stability. We look at the effect of marital status on the
35coefﬁcient of variation of BA using a three year window.40 The ﬁrst two columns of
Table 7 present the OLS and FE estimates. To be consistent with previous tables, we
continue to use the lagged value of marital status though the double lag may be more
appropriate (results are robust to this variation). Both columns show that marriage
has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect on the coefﬁcient of variation of BA
for low ability players, no effect for middle ability players and a positive effect for
high ability players, though statistically signiﬁcant only in the FE speciﬁcation. This
result is particularly interesting as low ability players have the highest variability in
their performance and marriage has an overall net stabilizing effect on this variabil-
ity. High ability players, however, see an increase in variability. For these players, the
“distraction” of marriage may override any stabilizing effect. This is in line with much
of the popular anecdotal evidence that marriage interferes periodically with the per-
formance of elite level athletes. Moreover, the ﬁnding that high ability players that
become more variable in their performance ultimately earn more is consistent with
Lazear’s (1998) theoretical model that ﬁrms pay a premium for “risky” workers.41
Next, using a subsample of our data from 1990 - 1993, we checked whether mar-
ried players have greater “star” power than single players where star power is cal-
culated as the difference between the player’s total marginal revenue product and
marginal revenue product based only on performance.42 We estimate these models
using OLS, as there is not sufﬁcient variation within player in marital status over
such a short time period (less than ﬁve percent of players switch marital status.)
While we do not ﬁnd that married players have greater star power than their single
counterparts, we do ﬁnd that the highest ability married players are exploited less
where “exploited” is deﬁned as the difference between total marginal revenue prod-
uct (that includes star power) and salary. The third and fourth columns (that differ
only by the exclusion of the quadratic terms in experience and age in column 3) of Ta-
36ble 7 show that the highest ability married players are underpaid between $437,700
and $481,600 less than the highest ability single players, or, approximately, 11 - 12
percent. In other words, married players in this group extract more of their economic
rent. Columns 5 and 6 (again, that differ only by the exclusion of the quadratic terms
in experience and age in column 5) normalize the underpayment by marginal revenue
product so that the dependent variable represents the fraction of exploitation. Here,
the point estimates are consistent with the previous ﬁnding but the statistical signif-
icance is weaker and sensitive to the inclusion of the quadratic terms of experience
and age. Column 5 shows that high ability married players are exploited less, that is,
they extract about 7.4 percent more of their marginal revenue product. This result
may imply that high ability married men are able to negotiate a higher salary for a
given marginal revenue product. There are a number of intuitive explanations. Per-
haps wives push their husbands’ to harder negotiate or perhaps marriage increases
the self-worth of the player. Interestingly, we do not see any analogous difference
between single and married players of the lower two groups suggesting that a high
level of innate ability (and, perhaps, status) is arguably a necessary requirement to
give the player market power.
9.2 Team Level Approach
Table 8 presents the results from team-ballpark level FE regressions. In columns
1 - 2, the log of total yearly ballpark attendance is regressed on the fraction of mar-
ried team members, a binary indicator for having been in the World Series in the
previous season, the lagged fraction of wins out of total games, the fraction of home
games out of total games, and manager and year indicator variables. In columns 3
- 4 the fraction of wins out of total games is regressed on batter and pitcher produc-
37tivity measures (team level batting and earned run averages), the fraction of home
games out of total games, and manager and year indicator variables.43 The results
show a positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between the average fraction
of married players at the team level and ballpark attendance. Increasing the frac-
tion of married players by ten percentage points (from a mean value of 68 percent)
is associated with approximately 1.8 percent higher yearly attendance. This repre-
sents roughly 21,000 additional attendees. In addition, there is also a positive and
signiﬁcant correlation with the number of team wins, albeit the correlation is a bit
weaker at ten percent. An increase in the average number of married players by 10
percentage points is associated with an increase of 0.002 in average team wins. This
amounts to just under 1/2 percent increase given the mean value of team wins of 0.50.
These latter results support the hypothesis that married players may have positive
beneﬁts to teams that manifest themselves in greater team popularity and success
and lend some explanation as to why team managers and owners may discriminate
in favor of such players.44
10 Conclusion
Using a large sample of professional baseball players from 1871 - 2007, this paper
aims to investigate the effect of marriage on male productivity. The novel contribu-
tion of our approach is that we use historical and exogenous measures of productivity
in a panel data setting, allowing us to also directly test the hypothesis that marriage
has a causal effect on wages through its impact on productivity. Focusing on the post-
1975 era, we ﬁnd heterogeneity in the effect of marriage on productivity where men
in the bottom third of the ability distribution experience a rather large and positive
effect (though sensitive to the empirical model and weakly signiﬁcant) and no effect
38for higher ability players. This positive effect for low ability players, however, trans-
lates into a fairly negligible effect on wages. Interestingly, players in the top third
of the ability distribution see no statistically signiﬁcant effect of marriage on produc-
tivity, on average, but do experience a positive and signiﬁcant direct marriage effect,
that is, they earn approximately 16 - 20 percent more than otherwise comparable sin-
gle players even when controlling for productivity. These ﬁndings are suggestive of
the varying roles that marriage plays along the underlying ability distribution. At
lower levels of ability, men beneﬁt more from what we term “indirect augmentation”
activities – spousal actions that directly impact productivity (and higher productivity
positively impacts wages). At higher levels of ability, men beneﬁt more from what
we term “direct augmentation” activities – spousal actions that directly impact wages
(for example, improving public image). We explore a number of additional outcome
variables that may be impacted by marital status and can provide some insight into
a fuller picture of the effect of marriage on productivity and wages. We ﬁnd some evi-
dence that marriage affects the variance of performance and that high ability married
players are better at extracting their economic rent (smaller gap between marginal
revenue product and wages). In addition, at the team level, ballpark attendance and
wins are positively correlated with the fraction of married players. Employers may
prefer married players because they lead to overall greater team success that is not
necessarily captured by the standard productivity measures.
Because few men are professional athletes, it is natural to question whether the re-
sults presented in this paper can be generalized beyond the sports industry. Although
professional baseball is a unique occupation, it shares certain features in common
with other occupations. Playing professional baseball requires long hours of practice,
intense competition and signiﬁcant travel. As such, we view our project as providing
insight into other similarly demanding professions such as CEOs, partners at law
39ﬁrms, politicians, and other high level corporate executives whose measures of pro-
ductivity are less straightforward. Moreover, the wife is the closest person to the life
of a professional athlete. This is again, however, not unique to professional sport. The
wife’s accessibility to the husband’s work world shares similarities to many of these
other professions. We also consider our project to be part of a larger group of papers
that use very speciﬁc data to analyze basic, yet extremely important labor economics
questions. Take, for example, labor supply responses to changes in wages. There
have been a number of papers analyzing the labor supply of taxi drivers [Camerer et
al. (1997), Farber (2005) and Chou (2000)], stadium vendors [Oettinger (1999)], and
bicycle messengers [Fehr and Goette (2007)]. These studies produce results that are
convincing in their speciﬁc setting and may well be general given sufﬁcient replica-
tion in alternative settings. Consequently, we view our project as laying the ground-
work for further research, perhaps in other individual sports or demanding profes-
sions where more direct productivity measurements are able to be collected by the
researcher.
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Notes
1See Altonji and Blank (1999) for a comprehensive survey of the gender discrimination literature.
2A number of papers have found evidence of sorting (among these Petersen, Penner and Hogsnes
(2006) and Korenman and Neumark (1991)). They have found that the marriage premium disappears
once controlling for profession. Given that our entire sample is in the same profession, the sorting issue
is of signiﬁcantly less concern, though, it is true that the type of man that selects into professional
baseball is not necessarily representative of men in general. We address this concern in Section 10.
3Krashinsky (2004) and Antonovics and Town (2004) have used ﬁrst differenced data on twins to
account for unobserved ability. The ﬁrst study ﬁnds that the marriage premium is statistically indis-
48tinguishable from zero among twin pairs while the latter ﬁnds that the marriage premium remains
positive and signiﬁcant.
4A number of papers [see, for example, Loh (1996)] have also considered cohabitation status as
separate from never-married and typically ﬁnd a cohabitation premium that is less than the marriage
premium but nonetheless positive and signiﬁcant. Stratton (2002) also considered cohabiters but found
that once taking into unobservable individual effects, the premium disappears.
5See Ribar (2004) for a review of the methodologies.
6In a similar vein, Stauffer and Buckley (2005) ﬁnd that supervisors give lower performance ratings
to workers of the opposite race.
7Price and Wolfers (2010) argue that productivity measures themselves are potentially affected due
to racial biases. We do not believe that this extends to our particular case of comparing married and
single players. That is, we do not believe that an umpire, when making a split second call, takes into
account marital status, a relatively non-salient characteristic of the player.
8Granted, DiMaggio was retired by the time he married Monroe, whom, by any standards, was not
a typical ballplayer’s wife.
9Our model is inspired by Daniel (1993). Without loss of generality, we assume that it is men that
potentially beneﬁt from marriage, though, it would be more accurate to state that it is the higher
earning spouse that potentially beneﬁts.
10For now, we take a very strict deﬁnition of productivity. Productivity is measured by traditional
outcome measures in baseball that will be described in the next section.
11"A wife’s look and behavior...can even affect her husband’s baseball career. You are part of the
package, and if you don’t look the part, well, some are going to notice." (Gmelch and San Antonio,
2001).
12The assumption of setting labor hours equal to zero for the wife would also arise endogenously
from the model given sufﬁciently large husband wages relative to wives. With rare exception, MLB
players earn wages that are much higher that any wage their wives could earn, which discourages
wives’ participation in the labor market. Moreover, there is also anecdotal evidence that the demands
of a professional baseball career do not facilitate a stable lifestyle where wives could invest in their own
careers. The far majority of wives of MLB players do not work outside of the home as they maintain
the household. (Source: email correspondence with Denise Schmidt, attorney for the Baseball Wives
Charitable Foundation.)
4913Pitchers are often batters as well but they are judged by their pitching and not by their batting
performance. While there have been players that have excelled in both roles (for example, Babe Ruth),
generally speaking, pitchers tend to be weak batters.
14During the ﬁrst six years in the league, players are under contract (with some exceptions) to a
particular team. Beginning in 1974, after three years in the league, a player becomes what is called
“arbitration eligible” and can renegotiate wage, presumably for better terms. The best players, called
“super-twos,” may be eligible after two years.
15In addition, signing bonuses and incentive clauses represent relatively small fractions of total
compensation – on average less than ten percent.
16This is generally the case. We provided the freelance researchers will sequential samples of 1000
players. Two of these random subsamples were restricted to more current years (one post-1948 and
another post-1988) in order to collect more observations on black players (for a separate project) and
increase the probability of ﬁnding wage data as it has been publicly available since the late 1980s.
17Some players perform both roles over their careers, hence, the sum of the two numbers is greater
than 5,000.
18Looking ahead, this problem is exacerbated by the fact that we eventually restrict the actual sam-
ple used in the estimation to those players for whom we have at least two observations (due to lagged
independent variables and ﬁxed effects estimation).
19Until 1947, blacks were not allowed in the league until Jackie Robinson famously crossed over the
color line. Blacks reached their peak in the early 1980s at around 27 percent of players. Today they
stand at roughly 10 percent of all players. Race is notoriously difﬁcult to collect because most data
on race is collected by simply looking at pictures of players, for example, baseball cards. At times,
particularly with dark-skinned Hispanics or lighter-skinned blacks, it is difﬁcult to determine race.
Moreover, it is uncertain with which race the players themselves identify.
20The last category is problematic because until a player has died, we cannot say for certain he never
married. Thus, a player who has been single prior to, throughout, and after his career (if ﬁnished) as
of 2007 is classiﬁed as never married. Of course, he may marry during a later year of his career or
after his career ends.
21A note on timing. If a player married in January through March in year y then we recorded his
year of marriage as y. If he married April through December then we recorded his year of marriage as
y+1. This is account for the fact that contracts are generally established for the MLB season by April.
50Of course, we also consider lags of marital status in our speciﬁcations so overall this particular way of
deﬁning marital status is robust to variations.
22There have always been superstar players in terms of ability but the mega wages the current
players earn, even when adjusting for inﬂation, is a relatively modern phenomenon. Babe Ruth earned
the top wage in 1927 at $70,000, by 2007 Jason Giambi, the highest paid player, was earning over $23
million. In 2010, Alex Rodriguez took home the top wage at $33 million.
23We also adjust the measure to take into account players that begin mid season by normalizing by
the fraction of the season played.
24We also collected and computerized in spreadsheet format all rookie year draft data going back to
1965 under the assumption that better players are picked in earlier rounds. This proved, somewhat
surprisingly, to be rather uncorrelated with any measure of future performance.
25None of the results are sensitive to this particular speciﬁcation. Contemporaneous values or addi-
tional lags of marital status provide similar results.
26It is possible to also consider team an outcome variable as better players may switch to better
teams. The results are not sensitive to the exclusion of team ﬁxed effects. Also note that we cannot
separately identify the team ﬁxed effect from the ballpark ﬁxed effect because while teams switch ball-
parks, ballparks do not switch teams. Thus, the  t indicators should be interpreted as joint team and
ballpark ﬁxed effects. Team-ballpark indicators also control for league effects (i.e., National League or
American League).
27Post-1975 is post elimination of the Reserve Clause. Many experts would argue that the elimi-
nation of the Reserve Clause in 1975 was a very important break in the dynamics of not only wage
setting, but also performance and incentives.
28In order to qualify for league awards, a player needs at least 400 at-bats. This restriction is far too
high for our purposes as we simply need enough to claim we have an accurate measure of the mean.
29It is interesting to point out that sport researchers and commentators maintain that marriage
is a hindrance to performance in elite/professional sports. Because the sport necessitates complete
dedication in terms of time, energy and focus, marriage, and all that comes with it, has been viewed
as disruptive to the demands of the sport. While most evidence is rather informal, Farrelly and Nettle
(2007) use a matched sample of married and single tennis players and ﬁnd that male tennis players
perform signiﬁcantly worse in the year after their marriage compared to the year before, whereas there
is no such effect for unmarried players of the same age.
5130Or, may also be evidence that we have not sufﬁciently captured productivity. We return to this
later.
31We include BA as our productivity measure but the overall results are robust to the inclusion
of any of the measures that we used in Section 7.1 with slight differences in the magnitudes of the
coefﬁcients.
32Baseball players spend a large fraction of the season “on the road,” that is, away from their spouses
and families. In addition, marital inﬁdelity is rumored to be common. At this point, we do not take a
stand on exactly what aspect of marriage leads to higher wages. To the extent that being on the road
and marital inﬁdelity reduce the beneﬁts of marriage, this would bias us against ﬁnding any effect.
Thus, ﬁnding an effect would mean that the true effect is even stronger.
33In order to eliminate the mechanical relationship between marital status and longer careers (i.e.
it is precisely because certain players have longer careers that we observe them getting married), we
repeated the test where we checked whether marital status in the ﬁrst three years of the career affects
the probability of having a career that lasts six years or more and we again conﬁrmed the positive and
signiﬁcant effect of marriage.
34A third approach to dealing with the nonrandom attrition problem could be the use of median
regression. The idea here is that we are mostly concerned with correlation of time-varying marital
status and exit at the lower end of the distribution. Players with sufﬁciently high ability may be
able to experience negative “shocks” to productivity and not be in danger of exit, whereas this same
negative shock to a player with low initial ability may be enough to cause his exit from the sample.
Median regression is less impacted by the extremes of the sample and intuitively less impacted by the
attrition problem. This approach, however, is proving to be extremely computationally intensive and
left for future research.
35The result from column 1 indirectly provides an additional robustness test. Recall in fact that most
players are locked in contracts for at least the ﬁrst three years of their career. Thus, restricting the
sample to players with four of less years of experience simply does not provide enough time for salaries
to respond to changes in the covariates.
36Because there may be some concern based on Table 1 that our estimation sample is not statistically
random, we also calculated the weights using the full population of players and without the marital
status or race variables. This had qualitatively little effect on the results.
37General attrition is quite complicated and, following the assumptions of the literature, we therefore
52assume that attrition is an absorbing state. This means that we drop all player observations after the
ﬁrst exit. Players temporarily leave MLB for a number of reasons, for instance due to injury or low
performance or any other reason that is unobservable to the econometrician. Because partial or one
year “breaks” are quite common, we consider a player to have exited only if he is unobserved in the
data for more than one year.
38Another take on this issue is that it is less of problem in our particular setting than it would be
with more standard panel data sets. For close to the past 40 or so years, baseball players have been
extremely high earning relative to the population. Median wages as well as the MLB minimum wage
have increased exponentially in the modern period. Thus, the question is whether players see marginal
improvements in their spousal applicant pool and probability of marrying as their careers progress and
wages increase from already high levels to even higher levels? Or, does the biggest improvement in the
applicant pool and the probability of marrying come when expectations of entering MLB pass a certain
threshold? We tend to believe the latter but do not entirely dismiss the former argument and therefore
address the concerns raised.
39A major exception to the pre-1975 era comes to mind. There is anecdotal evidence that Lou Gehrig’s
wife was instrumental in his salary negotiations.
40The coefﬁcient of variation, equal to the standard deviation divided by the mean value of BA for
each player, is calculated in rolling windows of three years. For example, the coefﬁcient of variation in
year y is calculated from the mean and variance of BA from years y   2, y   1 and y.
41Employers value risky workers because the worker in the upper tail of the productivity distribution
can be retained and the worker in the lower tail of the productivity distribution can be terminated; risk
provides option value to the worker. Bollinger and Hotchkiss (2003) test Lazear’s hypotheses using
baseball data and conﬁrm his main results.
42The data come from Dunn and Mullin (2002) and cover players from 1990 - 1993. Refer to their
article for details on how the variables are calculated.
43We would also like to include total team budgets as an explanatory variable as its clear that teams
with larger budgets can afford to attract the most highly skilled players but historical values of total
budgets prior to 1988 are extremely difﬁcult to ﬁnd. Team-ballpark ﬁxed effects should capture overall
average level differences in budgets across teams.
44We include pitchers in our calculation of the fraction of married players at the team level in order
to increase the sample size. Moreover, we do not divide our married players by ability levels due to
53lack of sufﬁcient sample size at the team-year level.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) Average Salary, normalized
Notes: Pitchers are excluded from the sample. Base year in panel (b) is 1965.
Source: Author calculations from The Baseball Archive and supplemented with author collected data as described in Section 5.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Years 1975 - 2007. Pitchers are excluded from sample.
Source: Author calculations from The Baseball Archive and supplemented with authors collected data as described in Section 5.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Years 1975 - 2007. Pitchers are excluded from sample.
Source: Author calculations from The Baseball Archive and supplemented with author collected data as described in Section 5.
57Table 1: Summary Statistics: Batters 1871 - 2007
Population Sample






age 9,236/3,379 24.18 2.84 24.19 2.78 age
right 8,578/3,262 0.70 0.46 0.69 0.46 =1 if the player is right-handed, 0
otherwise
left 8,578/3,262 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.49 =1 if the player is left-handed, 0
otherwise
white NA/3,3746 0.80 0.40 =1 if the player is white, 0 other-
wise
black NA/3,374 0.13 0.34 =1 if the player is black, 0 other-
wise
hispanic NA/3,374 0.10 0.30 =1 if the player is hispanic, 0 oth-
erwise
otherrace NA/3,374 0.01 0.07 =1 if other race, 0 otherwise
height 7,782/2,956 71.53 2.37 71.63 2.29 Height in inches
weight 8,727/3,295 180.17 24.24 181.23 18.21 Weight in pounds
Marital Status and Wages
married NA/19,294 0.69 0.46 =1 if the player is married, 0 oth-
erwise
yearsmar NA/14,256 4.30 6.05 = Year - Year of Marriage
wages NA/13,718 457.43 1036.66 Yearly Wage ($000s, adjusted for
inﬂation)
Productivity Related Measures
BA 48,960/22,510 0.241 0.089 0.249 0.072 Batting Average
OPS 46,728/21,779 0.651 0.229 0.674 0.189 On-base plus slugging
WAR 45,961/22,052 .846 1.792 0.986 1.877 Wins Above Replacement
PEV A 50,363/22,388 4.001 5.450 4.635 5.717 Performance Evaluation Value
G 49,356/22,576 72.88 52.26 83.40 50.09 Number of games played
PA 44,774/21,845 270.53 229.43 312.26 225.10 Plate Appearances
Other Variables
experience 49,357/22,576 5.51 4.40 5.72 4.21 Years in MLB
year 49,357/22,576 1954 38 1957 36 Year‡
position Fielding position
team   ballpark 244 Unique ids
manager 513 Unique ids
Fielding positions include ﬁrst baseman, second baseman, third baseman, catcher, center ﬁeld, left ﬁeld, right ﬁeld, shortstop. Also includes designated hitter and
outﬁelder. Wage equations are limited to 1905 - 2007 due to data availability.
Source: Multiple sources, see text.
5
8Table 2: The Effect of Marital Status on Productivity – Pre 1975
OLS FE OLS FE FE[w/ wgts] OLS FE OLS FE FE[w/wgts]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: BA Panel B: OPS
marriedy 1 .002 -.002 .003 -.007
(.002) (.002) (.005) (.006)
marriedy 1   ability1 .001 -.009 -.010 .000 -.024 -.021
(.004) (.007) (.008) (.012) (.021) (.025)
marriedy 1   ability2 .004 -.003 -.005 .007 -.005 -.008
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.011) (.012)
marriedy 1   ability3 .002 -.001 .0003 .001 -.006 -.004
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.006) (.006) (.008)
ability1 .431 .557
(.049)    (.206)   
ability2 .425 .538
(.048)    (.205)   
ability3 .430 .555
(.049)    (.205)   
cons .427 -.459 -.496 1.001 .617 2.846 2.984 2.808
(.048)    (.144)    (.148)    (.123)    (.120)    (.299)    (.303)    (.343)   
Obs 5840 5840 5660 5660 5593 5765 5765 5593 5593 5593
R2 .4 .653 .403 .654 .646 .432 .717 .439 .719 .705
Panel C: WAR Panel D: PEVA
marriedy 1 .109 .043 .242 .069
(.103) (.120) (.280) (.325)
marriedy 1   ability1 -.003 -.267 -.116 -.141 -.262 .051
(.240) (.429) (.496) (.688) (1.358) (1.488)
marriedy 1   ability2 .111 .217 .108 .438 .900 .755
(.150) (.174) (.157) (.436) (.463)  (.428) 
marriedy 1   ability3 .116 -.024 .001 .195 -.248 -.156







cons 4.272 -50.163 -52.778 36.876 26.453 -139.140 -143.535 118.026
(2.537)  (8.175)    (8.352)    (6.732)    (8.560)    (25.524)    (26.278)    (19.456)   
Obs 5711 5711 5531 5531 5464 5798 5798 5619 5619 5552
R2 .357 .669 .367 .673 .643 .407 .692 .417 .696 .667
Panel A: Dependent variable is equal to BA (columns 1 - 5). Panel B: Dependent variable is equal to OPS (columns 6 - 10). Panel C: Dependent variable is equal
to WAR (columns 1 - 5). Panel D: Dependent variable is equal to PEVA (columns 6 - 10). Robust standard errors, clustered on player id in parentheses. All models
control for team-ballpark, position, manager, and year ﬁxed effects. OLS controls include: age and its square, experience and its square, race dummies, height,
weight, left/right handed, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. FE controls include: age and experience
squared, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. Columns 5 and 10 are weighted by the inverse of PA.
Sample restricted to observations with at least 100 plate appearances.
 10 percent signiﬁcance level,   5 percent signiﬁcance level,    1 percent signiﬁcance level.
5
9Table 3: The Effect of Marital Status on Productivity – Post 1975
OLS FE OLS FE FE[w/ wgts] OLS FE OLS FE FE[w/wgts]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: BA Panel B: OPS
marriedy 1 -.0005 .002 -.007 .003
(.001) (.002) (.005) (.005)
marriedy 1   ability1 .005 .007 .007 .006 .011 .011
(.003)  (.004)  (.005) (.008) (.011) (.014)
marriedy 1   ability2 -.003 -.001 -.003 -.012 -.005 -.014
(.002) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.011) (.012)
marriedy 1   ability3 -.001 .001 .001 -.009 .005 .006
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.006) (.006) (.008)
ability1 .298 .411
(.054)    (.163)   
ability2 .304 .425
(.054)    (.163)   
ability3 .306 .436
(.054)    (.162)   
cons .336 .565 .572 .576 .556 1.923 1.931 1.901
(.057)    (.097)    (.096)    (.121)    (.172)    (.336)    (.331)    (.379)   
Obs 5907 5907 5844 5844 5844 5907 5907 5844 5844 5844
R2 .192 .506 .195 .507 .524 .359 .631 .365 .633 .621
Panel C: WAR Panel D: PEVA
marriedy 1 -.043 .053 -.379 .278
(.093) (.107) (.271) (.269)
marriedy 1   ability1 .143 .251 .365 .259 1.042 1.264
(.153) (.207) (.200)  (.380) (.471)   (.480)   
marriedy 1   ability2 -.125 .058 .049 -.663 .638 .611
(.175) (.205) (.183) (.522) (.607) (.542)
marriedy 1   ability3 -.067 .019 .002 -.487 -.035 -.023







cons 6.684 18.020 18.152 17.132 1.439 69.709 71.180 53.402
(3.374)   (5.753)    (5.748)    (5.806)    (8.913) (17.189)    (17.283)    (16.955)   
Obs 5754 5754 5692 5692 5692 5882 5882 5819 5819 5819
R2 .275 .588 .280 .588 .557 .363 .642 .368 .642 .618
Panel A: Dependent variable is equal to BA (columns 1 - 5). Panel B: Dependent variable is equal to OPS (columns 6 - 10). Panel C: Dependent variable is equal
to WAR (columns 1 - 5). Panel D: Dependent variable is equal to PEVA (columns 6 - 10). Robust standard errors, clustered on player id in parentheses. All models
control for team-ballpark, position, manager, and year ﬁxed effects. OLS controls include: age and its square, experience and its square, race dummies, height,
weight, left/right handed, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. FE controls include: age and experience
squared, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. Columns 5 and 10 are weighted by the inverse of PA.
Sample restricted to observations with at least 100 plate appearances.
 10 percent signiﬁcance level,   5 percent signiﬁcance level,    1 percent signiﬁcance level.
6
0Table 4: The Effect of Marital Status on Earnings
Pre-1975 Post-1975
OLS FE OLS FE FE OLS FE OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
marriedy 1 .015 -.004 .002 .083
(.024) (.024) (.034) (.051)
marriedy 1   ability1 .030 .032 .007 .058 .013 .009
(.046) (.063) (.083) (.071) (.126) (.132)
marriedy 1   ability2 .011 .015 .045 -.125 -.083 -.161
(.039) (.041) (.044) (.057)   (.111) (.110)
marriedy 1   ability3 .014 -.016 -.021 .042 .162 .209
(.032) (.030) (.033) (.044) (.059)    (.073)   
ability1 2.664 8.175
(.938)    (1.261)   
ability2 2.590 8.348
(.937)    (1.259)   
ability3 2.686 8.394
(.932)    (1.256)   
BAy 1 3.450 2.071 3.406 2.039 1.729 4.494 2.270 4.286 2.296 1.702
(.253)    (.180)    (.251)    (.182)    (.205)    (.355)    (.342)    (.347)    (.341)    (.411)   
cons 3.601 -5.786 -5.223 -4.279 8.545 30.605 30.145 29.325
(.623)    (1.078)    (1.115)    (1.127)    (1.237)    (2.653)    (2.681)    (2.834)   
Obs 3750 3750 3662 3662 3655 5447 5447 5390 5390 5387
R2 .886 .959 .853 .959 .983 .814 .894 .818 .894 .933
Dependent variable is equal to log(salary)y. Robust standard errors, clustered on player id in parentheses. All models control for team-ballpark, position, manager,
and year effects. OLS controls include: age and its square, experience and its square, race dummies, height, weight, left/right handed, lagged games played, and
indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. FE controls include: age and experience squared, lagged games played, and indicators for
more than three and more than six years of experience. Sample restricted to observations with at least 100 plate appearances. See Table 9 for expanded results.
 10 percent signiﬁcance level,   5 percent signiﬁcance level,    1 percent signiﬁcance level.
6
1Table 5: Robustness Test: Endogenous Attrition
Exper.  4yrs Exper.  8yrs Exper.  12yrs Exper.  16yrs Exper.  20yrs IPW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: BA
marriedy 1   ability1 .000 .003 .005 .006 .007 .006
(.014) (.005) (.004) (.004)  (.004)  (.004) 
marriedy 1   ability2 -.013 -.003 -.001 .000 .000 -.001
(.012) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
marriedy 1   ability3 .005 .000 .001 .001 .002 .001
(.007) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
cons 2.056 .955 .649 .638 .538 .677
(.949)   (.149)    (.098)    (.096)    (.090)    (.094)   
Obs 1783 3854 5138 5695 5840 5676
R2 .749 .571 .521 .51 .507 .530
Panel B: PEVA
marriedy 1   ability1 1.912 1.003 .909 1.088 1.033 .923
(1.186) (.593)  (.504)  (.469)   (.471)   (.471)  
marriedy 1   ability2 -.628 .254 .597 .691 .701 .759
(.846) (.557) (.583) (.610) (.594) (.619)
marriedy 1   ability3 .849 .238 -.125 -.176 -.069 -.098
(1.356) (.464) (.371) (.351) (.339) (.324)
cons 188.022 144.057 93.697 87.612 74.364 100.030
(119.084) (21.791)    (17.160)    (18.035)    (16.710)    (18.424)   
Obs 1765 3829 5113 5670 5815 5651
R2 .808 .72 .667 .645 .643 .651
Panel C: log(wages)
marriedy 1   ability1 .063 .063 .092 .025 .011 -.018
(.395) (.147) (.114) (.113) (.126) (.114)
marriedy 1   ability2 -.005 -.099 -.153 -.145 -.089 -.113
(.293) (.104) (.111) (.110) (.110) (.118)
marriedy 1   ability3 .034 .134 .131 .140 .158 .159
(.143) (.063)   (.061)   (.062)   (.060)    (.058)   
BAy 1 2.762 2.467 1.920 2.183 2.260 2.341
(.993)    (.390)    (.333)    (.328)    (.340)    (.348)   
cons 38.918 43.189 42.913 34.180 31.575 28.036
(22.512)  (3.875)    (2.690)    (2.983)    (3.051)    (3.217)   
Obs 1344 3339 4650 5229 5382 5238
R2 .968 .931 .914 .901 .895 .904
Dependent variable is equal to BA, PEV A or log(wages). Robust standard errors, clustered on player id in parentheses.
All models control for team-ballpark, position, manager, and year effects. All models estimated by FE and controls include:
age and experience squared, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience.
Sample restricted to observations with at least 100 plate appearances.
 10 percent signiﬁcance level,   5 percent signiﬁcance level,    1 percent signiﬁcance level.
62Table 6: Robustness Test: Dynamic Selection
Married in y +1 Married in y +2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
experience3yrs+   ability1 .012 -.038
(.052) (.055)
experience3yrs+   ability2 .028 .008
(.047) (.055)
experience3yrs+   ability3 .022 .055
(.036) (.048)
experience6yrs+   ability1 .085 -.028
(.085) (.103)
experience6yrs+   ability2 -.022 -.032
(.061) (.063)
experience6yrs+   ability3 -.026 .080
(.052) (.069)
log(wages)y   ability1 .019 .057
(.025) (.030) 
log(wages)y   ability2 -.008 -.012
(.019) (.023)
log(wages)y   ability3 -.018 .001
(.016) (.021)
 log(wages)y   ability1 -.029 -.082
(.075) (.062)
 log(wages)y   ability2 .037 .001
(.050) (.061)
 log(wages)y   ability3 .025 -.031
(.037) (.035)
 log(BA)y   ability1 -.072 .022
(.119) (.154)
 log(BA)y   ability2 -.101 -.139
(.072) (.081) 
 log(BA)y   ability3 -.040 .037
(.086) (.116)
ability1 -.808 -1.507 -1.142 -.592 -2.252 -3.649 .589 .586
(.808) (.973) (1.416) (1.391) (1.189)  (1.491)   (1.716) (1.826)
ability2 -.791 -1.178 -1.152 -.593 -2.252 -2.805 .527 .529
(.808) (.921) (1.414) (1.393) (1.189)  (1.464)  (1.718) (1.832)
ability3 -.765 -1.006 -1.120 -.527 -2.208 -2.932 .599 .584
(.807) (.918) (1.416) (1.393) (1.187)  (1.462)   (1.718) (1.830)
Obs 2112 1673 1180 1238 1493 1198 841 897
R2 .159 .191 .244 .233 .221 .28 .378 .323
Columns 1 - 4: Dependent variable is equal to one if year of marriage occurs in year y +1 , zero otherwise. Columns 5 - 8:
Dependent variable is equal to one if year of marriage occurs in year y +2 , zero otherwise. All models control for team-
ballpark, position, manager, and year effects and are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors, clustered on player id
in parentheses. OLS controls include: age and its square, experience and its square, race dummies, height, weight, left/right
handed, and lagged games played.
 10 percent signiﬁcance level,   5 percent signiﬁcance level,    1 percent signiﬁcance level.
63Table 7: The Effect of Marital Status on Performance Stability and Wage Underpay-
ment
OLS FE OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
marriedy 1   ability1 -.050 -.061 .766 .984 .061 .120
(.016)    (.025)   (3.557) (3.565) (.107) (.105)
marriedy 1   ability2 -.014 .008 2.923 3.039 .135 .136
(.015) (.021) (2.658) (2.665) (.095) (.095)
marriedy 1   ability3 .010 .027 -4.816 -4.377 -.074 -.049
(.009) (.010)    (1.789)    (1.884)   (.043)  (.044)
ability1 -.056 46.285 105.297 2.392 1.641
(.212) (26.514)  (49.751)   (.770)    (2.002)
ability2 -.109 44.613 103.507 2.269 1.549
(.213) (26.332)  (49.542)   (.768)    (1.985)
ability3 -.134 49.642 108.311 2.349 1.619
(.211) (25.992)  (49.087)   (.761)    (1.987)
cons .009
(.327)
Obs 6413 6413 647 647 647 647
R2 .272 .568 .419 .555 .264 .555
Columns 1 - 2: Dependent variable is equal to the coefﬁcient of variance of BA as described in the text. Columns 3 - 4:
Dependent variable is equal to exploitation/100,000 (marginal revenue product minus salary). Columns 5 - 6: Dependent
variable is equal to exploitation/MRP. Robust standard errors, clustered on player id in parentheses. Columns 1 - 2 control
for team-ballpark, position, manager, and year effects. Columns 3 - 6 control for team-ballpark, position and year effects.
OLS (columns 1,4,6) controls include: age and its square, experience and its square, race dummies, height, weight, left/right
handed, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. OLS (columns 3,5)
controls include: age, experience, race dummies, height, weight, left/right handed, lagged games played, and indicators for
more than three and more than six years of experience. FE (column 2) controls include: age and experience squared, lagged
games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. OLS models are estimated without
a constant. R2 in these models are obtained from the equivalent model estimated with a constant.
 10 percent signiﬁcance level,   5 percent signiﬁcance level,    1 percent signiﬁcance level.
64Table 8: The Effect of Marital Status on Ballpark Attendance and Team Wins
OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
married .172 .175 .026 .020
(.073)   (.082)   (.011)   (.012) 
home 4.089 3.508 .345 .257
(.963)    (.744)    (.112)    (.115)  
worldseriesy 1 .047 .056
(.028)  (.025)  
winsy 1 1.605 1.160
(.160)    (.145)   
BA 3.736 3.624
(.125)    (.142)   
ERA -.108 -.107
(.002)    (.003)   
cons 9.109 12.176 -.254 -.228
(.494)    (.465)    (.062)    (.073)   
Obs 1929 1929 2135 2135
R2 .892 .934 .826 .854
The dependent variable in columns 1 - 2 is equal to the log of ballpark attendance, in columns 3 - 4 it is the number of wins
divided by games played (wins). The variable married is the team level fraction of married players. home is the fraction
of homegames divided by total games. worldseries is a binary indicator equal to one if the team was in the world series.
BA is the team level batting average over all batters. ERA is the team level earned runs average over all pitchers. Robust
standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by team-ballpark. All columns control for year and manager effects.
 10 percent signiﬁcance level,   5 percent signiﬁcance level,    1 percent signiﬁcance level.
65Table 9: APPENDIX: The Effect of Marital Status on Productivity (BA) and Wages – Post 1975 (Expanded
Results)
BA log(wages)
OLS FE OLS FE FE OLS FE OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
marriedy 1 -.0005 .002 .002 .083
(.001) (.002) (.034) (.051)
marriedy 1   ability1 .005 .007 .007 .058 .013 .009
(.003)  (.004)  (.005) (.071) (.126) (.132)
marriedy 1   ability2 -.003 -.001 -.003 -.125 -.083 -.161
(.002) (.004) (.004) (.057)   (.111) (.110)
marriedy 1   ability3 -.001 .001 .001 .042 .162 .209
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.044) (.059)    (.073)   
age† -.005 -.002 .001 -.002 -.002 .048 -.009 .051 -.008 -.008
(.030) (.001)    (.030) (.001)    (.001)   (.064) (.002)    (.063) (.002)    (.002)   
age2 -.002 -.020 -.002 -.020 -.020 -.002 -.009 -.002 -.008 -.008
(.004) (.006)    (.004) (.006)    (.007)   (.001)  (.002)    (.001)  (.002)    (.002)   
experience† .020 -.001 .020 -.001 -.001 .285 -.004 .288 -.005 -.001
(.010)   (.001) (.010)   (.001) (.001) (.028)    (.002)   (.029)    (.002)   (.002)
experience2 -.007 -.005 -.007 -.005 -.005 -.008 -.004 -.008 -.005 -.001
(.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.007) (.001)    (.002)   (.001)    (.002)   (.002)
G
‡
y 1 .010 -.000 .010 -.000 -.000 .009 .005 .008 .005 .006
(.001)    (.001) (.001)    (.001) (.002) (.000)    (.000)    (.000)    (.000)    (.001)   
left -.003 -.003 .019 .011
(.002) (.002) (.046) (.047)
right -.010 -.011 -.013 -.024
(.002)    (.002)    (.052) (.052)
black .007 .007 .055 .098
(.003)   (.003)   (.067) (.070)
white .002 .002 .040 .071
(.003) (.003) (.069) (.070)
hispanic .004 .004 -.010 .008
(.003) (.003) (.060) (.061)
otherrace .0008 -.0001 .445 .432
(.012) (.012) (.377) (.359)
height -.0008 -.0008 .009 .015
(.0005) (.0005) (.011) (.010)
weight .000 .000 .006 .005
(.000)  (.000)  (.001)    (.001)   
experience3yrs+ -.000 .002 .000 .002 .002 .360 .480 .378 .478 .449
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.046)    (.050)    (.047)    (.050)    (.056)   
experience6yrs+ -.002 -.003 -.002 -.003 -.003 .191 .210 .188 .218 .288
(.002) (.002)  (.002) (.002)  (.003) (.040)    (.042)    (.040)    (.042)    (.051)   
ability1 .298 8.175
(.054)    (1.261)   
ability2 .304 8.348
(.054)    (1.259)   
ability3 .306 8.394
(.054)    (1.256)   
BAy 1 4.494 2.270 4.286 2.296 1.702
(.355)    (.342)    (.347)    (.341)    (.411)   
cons .336 .565 .572 .576 8.545 30.605 30.145 29.325
(.057)    (.097)    (.096)    (.121)    (.172)    (.336)    (.331)    (.379)   
Obs 5907 5907 5844 5844 5844 5447 5447 5390 5390 5387
R2 .192 .506 .195 .507 .524 .814 .894 .818 .894 .933
Dependent variable is equal to log(salary)y. Robust standard errors, clustered on player id in parentheses. All models control for team-ballpark, position, manager, and year effects. OLS controls include: age and its
square, experience and its square, race dummies, height, weight, left/right handed, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. FE controls include: age and experience
squared, lagged games played, and indicators for more than three and more than six years of experience. OLS models are estimated without a constant. R2 in these models are obtained from the equivalent model
estimated with a constant. Sample restricted to observations with at least 100 plate appearances. †: Age and experience are divided by 10 in columns 1 - 5. ‡: G is divided by 100 in columns 1 - 5.
 10 percent signiﬁcance level,   5 percent signiﬁcance level,    1 percent signiﬁcance level.
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